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INFO	OCT-00	ADS-00	INR-10	EUR-12	SS-10	OIC-02	AF-10
	CIAE-00	EA-10	DODE-00	H-01	IO-15	NEA-06	NSC-01
	NSCE-00	ARA-16	NSAE-00	L-03	DOE-10	PA-01	INRE-00
	SAL-01	OES-09	ACDA-12	ICAE-00	SP-02	SPRS-02	/142 R

DRAFTED BY PM/TMP:JDOBBINS/BLMURRAY:BLM

APPROVED BY THE ACTING SECRETARY

NSC:SKRAEMER S/S-O:RHSTERN

ICA:WKIEHL

IO/UNP:PWILCOX -

EA/VLC:DANDERSON

NEA/PAB:WSIMMONS

D:RPERITO

EUR/SOV:SVERSHBOW

EUR/RPM:ABOHLN

ACDA/MA:BJJONES

INR/PMA:GCROCKER

DIA:GGASBARRI

L/PM:MMATHESON

PA:CJOHNSON

PM:RBURT

S/S:APADAMS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR	
REVIEWED BY <u>T. Heavon</u>	DATE <u>8/31/82</u>
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TO ALL DIPLOMATIC POSTS PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY

EUROPEAN POLADS COLLECTIVE

INFO USICA WASHDC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 075135

FOR AMBASSADORS FROM ACTING SECRETARY STOESSEL

E.O. 12065: ADS 3/22/82 (STOESSEL, WALTER J.)

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TAGS: PARM, UNGA, AF, CB, LA, UR

SUBJECT: CW USE: PUBLIC AFFAIRS HANDLING OF SECRETARY

HAIG'S REPORT TO CONGRESS

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. ON MONDAY, MARCH 22, THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WILL RELEASE A MAJOR NEW REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON CHEMICAL WARFARE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA AND AFGHANISTAN. THE REPORT WILL ALSO BE RELEASED TO THE PRESS THAT SAME DAY AND, AS REPORTED SEPTTEL, TO THE UNITED NATIONS AND ALL MEMBER STATES.

3. THE KEY CONCLUSIONS OF THE REPORT ARE:

-- THAT SELECTED LAO AND VIETNAMESE FORCES, UNDER DIRECT SOVIET SUPERVISION, HAVE EMPLOYED LETHAL TRICHO-
THECENE TOXINS AND OTHER COMBINATIONS OF CHEMICAL AGENTS

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AGAINST H'MONG RESISTING GOVERNMENT CONTROL AND THEIR VILLAGES SINCE AT LEAST 1976. TRICHOTHECENE TOXINS HAVE BEEN POSITIVELY IDENTIFIED, BUT MEDICAL SYMPTOMS INDICATE THAT IRRITANTS, INCAPACITANTS, AND NERVE AGENTS ALSO HAVE BEEN EMPLOYED. THOUSANDS HAVE BEEN KILLED OR SEVERELY INJURED. THOUSANDS ALSO HAVE BEEN DRIVEN FROM THEIR HOMELAND BY THE USE OF THESE AGENTS. -- THAT VIETNAMESE FORCES HAVE USED LETHAL TRICHOTHECENE TOXINS ON DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEAN TROOPS AND KHMER VILLAGES; AND MEDICAL EVIDENCE INDICATES THAT IRRITANTS, INCAPACITANTS, AND NERVE AGENTS ALSO HAVE BEEN USED.

-- THAT SOVIET FORCES IN AFGHANISTAN HAVE USED A

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VARIETY OF LETHAL AND NONLETHAL CHEMICAL AGENTS ON MUJAHIDIN RESISTANCE FORCES AND AFGHAN VILLAGES SINCE THE SOVIET INVASION IN DECEMBER 1979, CAUSING THOUSANDS OF DEATHS. IN ADDITION, THERE IS SOME EVIDENCE THAT AFGHAN GOVERNMENT FORCES MAY HAVE USED SOVIET-SUPPLIED CHEMICAL WEAPONS AGAINST THE MUJAHIDIN EVEN BEFORE THE SOVIET INVASION. ALTHOUGH IT HAS NOT BEEN POSSIBLE TO VERIFY THROUGH SAMPLE ANALYSIS THE SPECIFIC AGENTS USED BY THE SOVIETS, A NUMBER OF AFGHAN MILITARY DEFECTORS HAVE NAMED THE AGENTS BROUGHT INTO THE COUNTRY BY THE SOVIETS AND HAVE DESCRIBED WHERE AND WHEN THEY WERE EMPLOYED. THIS INFORMATION HAS BEEN CORRELATED WITH OTHER EVIDENCE, INCLUDING THE REPORTED SYMPTOMS, LEADING TO THE CONCLUSION THAT NERVE AGENTS, PHOSGENE OXIME, AND VARIOUS INCAPACITANTS AND IRRITANTS HAVE BEEN USED. OTHER AGENTS AND TOXIC SMOKES ALSO ARE IN THE COUNTRY. SOME REPORTED SYMPTOMS ARE CONSISTENT WITH THOSE PRODUCED BY LETHAL OR SUBLETHAL DOSES OF TRICHOTHECENE TOXINS, BUT THIS EVIDENCE IS NOT CONCLUSIVE.

-- REGARDING THE SOVIET CONNECTION, THE CONCLUSION IS INESCAPABLE THAT THE TOXINS AND OTHER CHEMICAL WARFARE AGENTS WERE DEVELOPED IN THE SOVIET UNION, PROVIDED TO THE LAO AND VIETNAMESE EITHER DIRECTLY OR THROUGH THE TRANSFER OF KNOW-HOW, AND WEAPONIZED WITH SOVIET ASSISTANCE IN LAOS, VIETNAM AND KAMPUCHEA. SOVIET MILITARY FORCES ARE KNOWN TO STORE AGENTS IN BULK AND MOVE THEM TO THE FIELD FOR MUNITIONS FILL AS NEEDED. THIS PRACTICE ALSO IS FOLLOWED IN SOUTHEAST ASIA AND AFGHANISTAN, AS EVIDENCED BY MANY REPORTS WHICH SPECIFY THAT SOVIET TECHNICIANS SUPERVISE THE SHIPMENT, STORAGE, FILLING, AND LOADING ONTO AIRCRAFT OF THE CHEMICAL MUNITIONS. THE DISSEMINATION TECHNIQUES REPORTED AND OBSERVED EVIDENTLY HAVE BEEN DRAWN FROM YEARS OF SOVIET CHEMICAL WARFARE TESTING

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AND EXPERIMENTATION. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT ANY ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATION, SUCH AS THE HYPOTHESIS THAT THE VIETNAMESE PRODUCE AND EMPLOY TOXIN WEAPONS ON THEIR OWN.

4. POSTS HAVE ALREADY RECEIVED KEY SEGMENTS OF THE REPORT, IN FOREIGN LANGUAGES AS WELL AS ENGLISH, VIA USINFO; COPIES OF THE ENTIRE REPORT ARE BEING POUCHED. IN MANNER APPROPRIATE FOR HOST COUNTRY, AMBASSADORS ARE REQUESTED TO ENSURE CO-ORDINATED COUNTRY TEAM DISSEMINATION OF THIS REPORT, AFTER ITS RELEASE IN WASHINGTON MONDAY, TO KEY HOST GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AND TO APPROPRIATE MEDIA, SCIENTIFIC, DEFENSE AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS OPINION LEADERS.

5. FOLLOWING QS AND AS HAVE BEEN PREPARED FOR DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN TN RESPONDING TO QUERIES GENERATED BY THE RELEASE OF THE REPORT. ALL POSTS MAY DRAW ON POINTS BELOW AS REQUIRED.

QUESTION: ON THE BASIS OF THE INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THIS REPORT, IT WOULD APPEAR THAT THE SOVIETS ARE BLATANTLY VIOLATING INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS OUTLAWING SUCH ACTIVITIES. HAS THE U.S. FORMALLY CHARGED THE SOVIET UNION, OR FOR THAT MATTER LAOS OR VIETNAM, WITH VIOLATING THESE AGREEMENTS? IF NOT, WHY NOT?

ANSWER: FOR THE LAST THREE YEARS, THE USG HAS MADE REPEATED DEMARCHES TO THE SOVIET UNION, AND TO THE GOVERNMENTS OF LAOS AND VIETNAM, REGARDING THE ACTIVITIES DETAILED IN THIS REPORT AND THEIR OBLI-
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GATIONS UNDER THE BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION, AND THE GENEVA PROTOCOL AND RELATED RULES OF CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW. ALL OF THESE DEMARCHES HAVE BEEN REJECTED, WITHOUT SERIOUS DISCUSSION, AS UNFOUNDED. WHEN THESE BILATERAL EFFORTS FAILED TO BRING AN END TO CHEMICAL ATTACKS, THE UNITED STATES TOOK THE ISSUE TO THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. IN 1980 WE RAISED THE ISSUE IN THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY TO SECURE BROADER SUPPORT FOR, AND WIDER PARTICIPATION IN, EFFORTS TO HALT THESE ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES. AS A RESULT OF US EFFORTS, AND THOSE OF OTHER INTERESTED NATIONS, THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY INITIATED AN INVESTIGATION INTO CW USE WHICH IS STILL UNDERWAY. AS THIS US GOVERNMENT REPORT MAKES CLEAR, THE SOVIET UNION AND ITS ALLIES ARE USING LETHAL CHEMICAL WEAPONS IN AFGHANISTAN AND SOUTHEAST ASIA. THE USE OF SUCH WEAPONS IN WAR IS A VIOLATION OF THE
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GENEVA PROTOCOL OF 1925 AND OF RELATED RULES OF CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW; THE MANUFACTURE OR POSSESSION OF TOXIN WEAPONS, SUCH AS THOSE BEING USED IN LAOS AND KAMPUCHEA, IS A VIOLATION OF THE 1972 BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION.

THE UNITED STATES HAS ENCOURAGED AS MANY OTHER GOVERNMENTS AS POSSIBLE TO BECOME INVOLVED IN THE COLLECTION AND DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION ON THE USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS. WE HAVE ALSO PRESSED THE SOVIET UNION, LAOS AND VIETNAM TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE ON-GOING UN INVESTIGATION BY CO-OPERATING WITH THE GROUP OF EXPERTS AND ALLOWING THEM FREE ACCESS TO THE AREAS IN QUESTION. TO DATE, HOWEVER, THE SOVIET UNION, LAOS AND VIETNAM HAVE REFUSED TO CO-OPERATE WITH THE UN GROUP IN ANY WAY. IT IS OUR HOPE THAT THE REPORT WE HAVE JUST RELEASED, AND ANY FUTURE MATERIAL THE US AND OTHERS

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MAY BE ABLE TO MAKE AVAILABLE, WILL ENCOURAGE A SUFFICIENTLY WIDESPREAD INTERNATIONAL PROTEST TO FORCE CESSATION OF THESE ATTACKS.

QUESTION: WHY HAVE YOU TAKEN THIS MATTER TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, RATHER THAN FOLLOWING THE PROCEDURES SPECIFIED IN THESE CONVENTIONS?

ANSWER: THE GENEVA PROTOCOL OF 1925 CONTAINS NO VERIFICATION ARRANGEMENTS OR PROCEDURES FOR RAISING AND RESOLVING COMPLIANCE PROBLEMS. THE 1972 BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (BWC), CONTAINS PROVISION FOR CONSULTATION AND COOPERATION IN RESOLVING COMPLIANCE PROBLEMS. IN ACCORDANCE WITH THIS PROVISION, THEREFORE, WE HAVE REPEATEDLY APPROACHED THE SOVIETS BILATERALLY ON THESE ISSUES. THEY HAVE REFUSED TO CO-OPERATE OR ENGAGE IN CONSULTATIONS. THE BWC ALSO PROVIDES THAT SUCH CONSULTATION AND CO-OPERATION MAY OCCUR THROUGH OTHER INTERNATIONAL PROCEDURES WITHIN THE UN FRAMEWORK. THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY IS, OF COURSE, ONE OF THE BODIES WITHIN THE UN FRAMEWORK FOR DEALING WITH SUCH MATTERS, WHERE THE POSSIBILITY OF VETO DOES NOT EXIST. IT IS FOR THIS REASON THAT THE UNITED STATES AND OTHER CONCERNED GOVERNMENTS HAVE TAKEN THE ISSUE TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY.

NEVERTHELESS, THE US CONTINUES TO REVIEW THE POSSIBILITY OF OTHER REMEDIES, AND DOES NOT EXCLUDE ANY POSSIBLE AVENUE. THE UNITED STATES IS ALSO INTERESTED IN IMPROVING EXISTING ARMS CONTROL ARRANGEMENTS IN THIS FIELD. WE ARE ACTIVELY PARTICIPATING IN THE GENEVA-BASED COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT'S WORK ON ELABO-

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RATNG AN EFFECTIVE CONVENTION TOWARD BANNING THE PRODUCTION AND STOCKPILING OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS, AS WELL AS EXAMINING OTHER WAYS TO STRENGTHEN EXISTING ARMS CONTROL CONSTRAINTS ON CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL AND TOXIN WEAPONS.

QUESTION: WHY HAVEN'T YOU TAKEN THIS MATTER TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL, AS PROVIDED IN ARTICLE VI OF THE BWC?

ANSWER: COMPLAINT TO THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL IS NOT LIKELY TO BE HANDLED VERY SATISFACTORILY WHEN THE PARTY CAUSING THE COMPLAINT IS A VETO WIELDING PERMANENT MEMBER OF THAT BODY. WE NEVERTHELESS CONTINUE TO KEEP OPEN RECOURSE TO THIS BODY ON THIS ISSUE.

RESORT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL IS BUT ONE OF SEVERAL POSSIBILITIES WHICH A PARTY TO THE BWC MAY CHOOSE TO DEAL WITH COMPLIANCE CONCERNS. OTHERS INCLUDE REQUESTS FOR CONSULTATIONS AND CO-OPERATION ON A BILATERAL OR MULTILATERAL BASIS, AMONG STATES PARTIES OR THROUGH INTERNATIONAL PROCEDURES WITHIN THE UN FRAMEWORK. THE LATTER INCLUDES TAKING THE ISSUE TO THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY -- A BODY IN WHICH, UNLIKE THE SECURITY COUNCIL, THE SOVIET UNION OR ANY OTHER SINGLE STATE IS UNABLE TO PREVENT ACTION BY EXERCISING A VETO RIGHT. ADDITTONALLY, THE BWC ONLY APPLIES TO ONE TYPE OF THE WEAPONS IN USE -- TOXIN WEAPONS -- AND, THEREFORE, DOES NOT ALONE PROVIDE AN ADEQUATE FRAMEWORK FOR DEALING WITH THE OVERALL PROBLEM WHICH INCLUDES, IN ADDITION TO TOXIN WEAPONS, THE USE OF LETHAL AND INCAPACITANT CHEMICAL WEAPONS IN LAOS, KAMPUCHEA AND AFGHANISTAN.

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QUESTION: IN THE FACE OF ALL THIS EVIDENCE THAT THE SOVIET UNION DOES NOT ABIDE BY ITS OBLIGATIONS UNDER EXISTING ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS, HOW CAN THE U.S. CONSIDER, LET ALONE CARRY OUT, ANY ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE SOVIETS?

ANSWER: EQUITABLE AND VERIFIABLE AGREEMENTS WHICH EFFECTIVELY ENSURE THAT THE WEAPONS AND/OR ACTIVITIES CONCERNED HAVE BEEN REDUCED OR ELIMINATED CAN PROMOTE PEACE AND SECURITY AND ARE THUS IN OUR NATIONAL TINTEREST. EVIDENCE THAT EXISTING ARMS CONTROL ARRANGEMENTS ARE INADEQUATE MAKE IT ALL THE MORE IMPERATIVE FOR EFFORTS TO BE MADE TO CONCLUDE AGREEMENTS WHICH CAN BE VERIFIED, AND WHICH CONTAIN PROVISIONS WHICH ENSURE THAT COMPLIANCE CONCERNS BE DEALT WITH SERIOUSLY. THIS TS THE CORNERSTONE OF THIS ADMINSTRATION'S POSITION IN ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS TODAY; AND IT IS THE ONLY BASIS ON WHICH THE

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UNITED STATES WILL ADHERE TO OTHERWISE ACCEPTABLE
ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS IN THE FUTURE.

QUESTION: IN LIGHT OF THIS INFORMATION, DOES
THE U.S. INTEND TO CONTINUE TO SUPPORT EFFORTS TO
CONCLUDE A COMPLETE AND EFFECTIVELY VERIFIABLE PRO-
HIBITION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS? WHAT ARE THE CHANCES
OF CONCLUDING SUCH AN AGREEMENT?

ANSWER: PRECISELY BECAUSE INNOCENT PEOPLE ARE
STILL DYING TODAY FROM CHEMICAL WEAPONS, THE U.S.
BELIEVES IT IS ALL THE MORE IMPERATIVE FOR A VERIFI-
ABLE AND EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT TO BE
CONCL'DED WHICH WOULD TOTALLY ELIMINATE THESE WEAPONS
FROM THE ARSENALS OF STATES. THE US HAS REAFFIRMED ITS

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COMMITMENT TO THE GOAL OF CONCLUDING A COMPLETE AND
EFFECTIVELY VERIFIABLE PROHIBITION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS
DEVELOPMENT, PRODUCTION AND STOCKPILING, AND THE U.S.
DELEGATION TO THE 40-NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT HAS
BEEN INSTRUCTED TO PARTICIPATE ACTIVELY IN THE ON-GOING
WORK IN GENEVA TO ELABORATE SUCH A CONVENTION.

ACHIEVING AGREEMENT ON A PROHIBITION WHICH WILL
EFFECTIVELY GUARANTEE STATES THAT THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS
THREAT HAS BEEN ELIMINATED WILL BE NEITHER EASY NOR
RAPID. MANY TECHNICAL AND POLITICAL PROBLEMS EXIST
WHICH COMPLICATE THE PROCESS -- THE MOST IMPORTANT OF
WHICH PERTAIN TO VERIFICATION AND COMPLIANCE ARRANGE-
MENTS. THESE ARE THE PROBLEMS TO WHICH THE U.S.
IS CALLING ON THE CD, AND OTHERS IN THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNITY, TO DEVOTE THE MAJORITY OF THEIR TIME AND
ATTENTION. HOWEVER, MEANINGFUL PROGRESS IN THIS AREA
WILL DEPEND LARGELY ON THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE SOVIET
UNION IS PREPARED TO ALTER ITS PREVIOUS INSISTENCE ON
THE UNREALISTIC AND UNWORKABLE "TRUST-AND-GOOD-FAITH"
APPROACH TO TREATY COMPLIANCE, IN FAVOR OF STRICT AND
EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL VERIFICATION ARRANGEMENTS.

QUESTION: IS THE U.S. PREPARED TO RESUME THE
U.S./SOVIET BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS ON A CHEMICAL
WEAPONS CONVENTION BEGUN IN 1977?

ANSWER: THE POSSIBILITY OF RESUMING BILATERAL
U.S./SOVIET NEGOTIATIONS ON A CW CONVENTION REMAINS
OPEN, PENDING A DEMONSTRATION BY THE SOVIET UNION OF
GENUINE READINESS TO NEGOTIATE VERIFICATION AND COM-
PLIANCE ARRANGEMENTS, AND TO COMPLY WITH THEIR
OBLIGATIONS UNDER EXISTING AGREEMENTS. TO DATE,
HOWEVER, SOVIET INTRANSIGENCE IN THE VERIFICATION
AND COMPLIANCE AREA HAS BEEN THE PRINCIPAL OBSTACLE

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TO MEANINGFUL PROGRESS TOWARD SUCH A CONVENTION. MOREOVER, EVIDENCE OF SOVIET FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH EXISTING INTERNATIONAL CONSTRAINTS ON CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS COMPLICATE THIS PROCESS FURTHER. IT ALSO MAKES CLEAR THAT INCLUSION OF STRICT AND EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION ARRANGEMENTS IN A MULTI-LATERAL CW CONVENTION IS ESSENTIAL. NEVERTHELESS, THE U.S. REMAINS COMMITTED TO THE GOAL OF CONCLUDING A COMPLETE, EFFECTIVE, AND VERIFIABLE PROHIBITION OF THE DEVELOPMENT, PRODUCTION AND STOCKPILING OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS; AND TO THIS END, THE US IS ACTIVELY PARTICIPATING IN THE WORK OF THE 40-NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT, NOW MEETING IN GENEVA, ON THE ELABORATION OF SUCH A CONVENTION. QUESTION: ISN'T THIS ALL JUST A PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN DESIGNED TO PROVIDE JUSTIFICATION FOR THE U.S. DECISION TO RESUME PRODUCTION OF NERVE GAS? ANSWER: THE U.S. DECISION TO MODERNIZE ITS CHEMICAL WEAPONS DETERRENT RETALIATORY CAPABILITY WAS NOT TAKEN IN RESPONSE TO REPORTS OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS USE. THE U.S. FIRST EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT REPORTS OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS USE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA IN 1978, AND IN AFGHANISTAN IN EARLY 1980. THE U.S. MADE THESE CONCERNS KNOWN PUBLICLY OVER TWO YEARS AGO UNDER A DIFFERENT ADMINISTRATION, WITH A DIFFERENT DEFENSE POLICY. SINCE THEN, OTHER GOVERNMENTS AND INDEPENDENT OBSERVERS HAVE ALSO EXPRESSED CONCERN, AND HAVE THEMSELVES UNCOVERED EVIDENCE THAT CHEMICAL AND TOXIN WEAPONS ARE BEING USED.

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IT IS LONG ESTABLISHED U.S. POLICY TO MAINTAIN A RETALIATORY CHEMICAL WEAPONS CAPABILITY, DESIGNED TO DETER THE USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS AGAINST THE U.S. AND ITS ALLIES. GIVEN THE SUBSTANTIAL SOVIET CAPABILITIES IN THIS AREA, AND SOVIET UNWILLINGNESS TO NEGOTIATE AN EFFECTIVE AND VERIFIABLE BAN ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS, THE U.S. CONSIDERED IT NECESSARY TO PROCEED WITH STEPS TO MODERNIZE ITS CHEMICAL WEAPONS DETERRENT RETALIATORY CAPABILITIES IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN A VIABLE DETERRENT, AND TO INCREASE THE INCENTIVES FOR THE SOVIETS TO WORK SERIOUSLY TOWARD CONCLUDING A COMPLETE, EFFECTIVE AND VERIFIABLE PROHIBITION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS.

QUESTION: ISN'T THE U.S. BEING SOMEWHAT HYPOCRITICAL ON THE USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS, GIVEN THE FACT THAT THE U.S. ITSELF USED CHEMICAL WEAPONS DURING THE VIETNAM WAR?

ANSWER: NO. AT NO TIME DURING THE VIETNAM WAR DID THE U.S. USE LETHAL OR INCAPACITANT CHEMICAL WARFARE AGENTS. AND THE U.S. HAS NEVER R E P E A T NEVER
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USED TOXIN WEAPONS. U.S. USE OF RIOT CONTROL OR IRRITANT AGENTS AGAINST ENEMY COMBATANTS AND THE USE OF THE DEFOLIANT AGENT ORANGE DURING THE VIETNAM WAR IS A MATTER OF EXTENSIVE PUBLIC RECORD. WE HAVE NEITHER DENIED THESE ACTIVITIES NOR ENDEAVoured TO KEEP THEM FROM THE PUBLIC. MOREOVER THE U.S. NEVER R E P E A T NEVER DELIBERATELY USED THE DEFOLIANT AGENT ORANGE AGAINST PEOPLE; AND WE DISCONTINUED THE USE OF AGENT ORANGE IN VIETNAM, AND THE UNITED STATES AS WELL, IN 1970 WHEN THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE ISSUED A REPORT INDICATING POSSIBLE LONG-TERM HARMFUL EFFECTS FROM EXPOSURE TO AGENT ORANGE. AGENT ORANGE HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN USED IN THE U.S. FOR AGRICULTURAL AND

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FOREST MANAGEMENT PURPOSES.

THE U.S. HAS ADHERED STRICTLY TO ITS OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE BWC, THE GENEVA PROTOCOL AND RELATED RULES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW. WE WILL CONTINUE TO DO SO. THESE OBLIGATIONS, OF COURSE, CONCERN THE USE OF LETHAL AND INCAPACITANT CHEMICAL WEAPONS IN WAR, AND THE USE OR EVEN POSSESSION OF TOXIN WEAPONS AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS. THE USE OF HERBICIDES AND RIOT CONTROL OR IRRITANT AGENTS IN DEFENSIVE MILITARY MODES TO SAVE LIVES IS PERMITTED.

QUESTION: IS THE U.S. PROVIDING THIS INFORMATION TO THE UN GROUPS OF EXPERTS INVESTIGATING CHEMICAL WEAPONS USE?

ANSWER: YES. WE WILL BE PROVIDING THE REPORT TO THE UN SECRETARY-GENERAL, IN ACCORDANCE WITH UNGA RESOLUTIONS 35/144 C OF DECEMBER 12, 1980 AND 36/96 C OF DECEMBER 9, 1981. THESE RESOLUTIONS REQUEST THAT STATES PROVIDE INFORMATION ON THE USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS TO THE UNITED NATIONS. WE WILL ALSO REQUEST THAT THE REPORT BE PROVIDED TO THE GROUP OF EXPERTS INVESTIGATING CHEMICAL WEAPONS USE, AND TO ALL MEMBER NATIONS. US EXPERTS WILL ALSO BE PREPARED TO MEET AGAIN WITH THOSE CARRYING OUT THE UN INVESTIGATION TO ANSWER QUESTIONS REGARDING INFORMATION IN THE REPORT, AND TO PROVIDE FURTHER DETAILS.

6. KABUL MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.

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